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Introduction
The state of education in most countries of sub-Saharan Africa (sSA) is perilous. In its assessment of the progress toward universal primary education, a UNESCO report notes that several regions are far from achieving it, "... and in the case of sSA, actually lagging behind." In the poorest performing countries in this region, enrollments are particularly low, dropout rates high, incomes mostly stagnant, costs of schooling signiÞcant relative to income, income inequality high, government expenditure per pupil low, and opportunities of employment for the educated scarce. These indicators have shown little or no improvement in the last two or three decades and in some cases have actually worsened.
The AIDS epidemic of the nineties has further exacerbated the situation by decreasing life expectancy in some of these countries.
In this paper, we argue that the education and economic condition of the worst-performing sSA countries can be characterized as a trap, or proximal to one. We present a simple model of education attainment with educated and uneducated workers that exhibits a trap when the income share of education costs are high relative to the return to being educated. We calibrate this model to economies in this region and study policies that have the potential to free them from the trap.
Our model is based on the simple heterogeneous-agent, two-period overlapping generation model of education acquisition developed in Caucutt and Kumar (2001) . 1 A liquidity constrained parent, who is either an "educated" or "uneducated" worker, makes the decision of whether or not to incur the cost of educating a child taking into account the child's academic ability. The probability that a child who is sent to school will become an educated worker the following period depends positively on this ability. Any child who drops out (fails) will remain an uneducated worker next period. The two types of workers are imperfect substitutes in aggregate production.
In the above-mentioned paper, we prove the existence of equilibrium in this model and its uniqueness, and characterize the dynamics in detail. We present only a brief description of the model in this paper and instead develop conditions that give rise to a locally stable "trap" in which all workers remain uneducated. A trap typically occurs when the initial fraction of educated people in the workforce is too low. The wages of the uneducated workers are too low for them to Þnd it proÞtable to send their children to school. This results in a decrease in the fraction of educated workers next period, which further decreases the wages of the uneducated workers and reinforces the above-mentioned behavior. We derive a sufficient condition for this trap to occur and be locally stable. As one might expect, a trap is more likely when the cost of education relative to the income of the uneducated is high, the wage gain to becoming educated is low, and the discount factor is low. 1 In that paper we focused on a unique steady state with positive education attainment and calibrated it to the US economy in order to study whether further subsidization of college education is warranted.
The method of conducting policy experiments on a calibrated model is particularly useful in the context of a trap and paucity of good quality data. We calibrate the model using data from several countries in the region, so that a typical economy in this region is close to a trap. We then consider policies that have the potential to free the economy from a trap and set it on a path to higher education attainment and output. Since the behavior of the uneducated poor, who form the vast majority close to the trap, is responsible for the trap, it is natural to consider a policy of subsidizing their direct and indirect costs of education. Two features of the model, heterogeneity in types and heterogeneity in ability, play important roles in these policy experiments. The former allows redistribution from richer to poorer parents. However, in the trap everyone is poor. So the kick-start at the trap comes from the latter heterogeneity, that is, the redistribution from poor parents of low ability children to those with higher ability children. 2 A simple tax and subsidy scheme that embodies the above-mentioned redistribution is not only able to set the economy on a path toward a better steady state, but also does better in terms of welfare, both across steady states and including transition, than a scheme that abolishes child labor or one that institutes and enforces compulsory enrollment. Under revenue neutrality, these latter policies are unable to reverse the loss of contributions low ability children would have made to their families had they not been forced to attend school. These simulations question the stated goal of several agencies in achieving universal enrollment. At the current stage of development of these economies and the quality of their educational systems that are likely to prevail in the near future, polices that guarantee this level of enrollment need not be welfare improving. The experiments also show that the economy need not be dependent on foreign aid in order to develop.
We are silent in our study on the issues of the AIDS epidemic and gender disparities, for reasons of theoretical and especially quantitative tractability. These are important issues that warrant greater attention than we have accorded them. In addition to being desirable in its own right, increasing life expectancy by addressing the AIDS problem would affect school enrollments and attainment.
Therefore, we view our analysis as only the Þrst step in understanding the complex economic and educational condition of this region.
Clearly, we are not the Þrst to model development traps, even when attention is restricted to human capital. See, for instance, the recent work by Galor and Zeira (1993) and Azariadis (1996) and the references therein. Features such as Þxed costs and liquidity constraints have been highlighted as potential sources of traps in earlier studies. However, unlike most studies our model features heterogeneity in education and thus earnings. Even if a positive steady state is reached in our model, 2 A compulsory education system would override this kind of redistribution. In the next section we provide evidence that compulsory education laws, even if they exist on paper, are not enforced. We also consider, in our policy experiments, the consequences of enforcing such laws.
there will be a mix of educated and uneducated agents. This seems empirically more relevant than having all agents acquire the same level of human capital, high or low, in a representative agent framework. While a condition for a trap to occur could be equally well derived in a representative agent model, in order to study the "diffusion" of education over time it is necessary to explicitly model the dynamics of heterogeneity. We can also focus attention on those agents whose behavior is responsible for the education trap, the uneducated poor. In contrast, a representative agent model, or our model with linear utility which has a similar ßavor, would assign the same cost of education to all parents making it hard to discern the dynamic effect of the poor parents' behavior in the neighborhood of a trap. Heterogeneity also allows us to shed light on the forces governing inequality in earnings.
Perhaps the most novel aspect of our study is the calibration of a trap to actual economies and policy experiments we conduct to pry them out of the trap. We are thus able to make a few quantitative assessments in a Þeld of study that has thus far remained mainly qualitative.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we brießy survey the condition of education in sSA to motivate our study and provide the rationale for using a model with a trap to study them.
Section 3 describes the model and provides a sufficient condition for a locally stable trap. We turn to calibrating the model to a "typical" sSA economy in Section 4, and present the results of our policy experiments in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
The Condition of Education and the Economy in Sub-Saharan Africa
The UNESCO document, Education for All: Year 2000 Assessment, sounds an alarming note about the state of education in sub-Saharan Africa (sSA). It states that while most of the world is on course to achieving universal access to primary education, other parts of the world are actually slipping behind: "The problem is particularly marked in sSA, with an increase in the number of children not in school." The OXFAM report, Education Now, likewise singles out this region, calling the education situation there "particularly dire." In this section we highlight some aspects of the condition of basic education in this region using data from the above two reports and from other sources. The aim is not to provide a comprehensive description of the state of education in sSA, but enough details to motivate our study as well as to make empirical contact for the model we will be using. While trends for the sSA region as a whole are presented, attention is focused on eighteen countries which particularly lag behind in education attainment. Data on selected variables for this sub-sample are presented in Tables 1 and 2 .
• Low enrollment rates: Most educational indicators for sSA have either been stagnant at or declining from already poor levels. While the gross enrollment ratios in primary education having been increasing between 1990 and 1998 and approaching 100% in regions such as Latin America, the Caribbean, and East Asia, this ratio has seen little change over the period in sSA, hovering around 75%. For our sub-sample of countries, the average gross enrollment rate was much lower, at about 55%. The median net intake rate, which is "based on the number of new entrants in the Þrst grade of primary education who are of the official primary school entrance age, expressed as a percentage of the population of the corresponding age," was 34% in sSA as late as 1998. From Barro & Lee (1996) we can see for most of these countries there was a drop in % of population with primary attainment between 1985 and 1990.
Over the last decade, the number of out-of-school children has continued to increase in this region. The region has the largest proportion of out-of-school children, at about 40%; in a third of the countries, 60% or more of children are not in school. Evidently, compulsory schooling laws, even where they might exist in paper, are not enforced. Table 1 The condition of education in a sub-sample of sub-Saharan African countries Barro & Lee (1996) public education expenditure as a % of GNP: WEI, UNESCO primary expenditure per student in $: Barro & Lee (1996) • Low attainment: While the trends indicate stagnancy, the level of educational attainment for the sub-sample of sSA countries is already very low. In the year 1990, the average Þgure for percentage of population over 15 with no education (computed from Barro and Lee (1996) ) was over 66%, the percentage who completed primary education was less than 6%, while the percentage who completed secondary education was negligible, at 0.6%. The average attainment as measured in years of education was about 1.4 at the primary level and at 0.15 was negligible at the secondary level. Moreover, these Þgures have hovered around these low levels for the last few decades. The adult literacy in sSA was the lowest among the world's less developed regions (57%).
• High dropout rates: Among those who do attend, the dropout and repetition rates have continued to be high. From Barro and Lee (1996) we see that the average primary school dropout rate in our sub-sample was close to 44%, with Guinea-Bissau having a rate of 92%. Even in the better performing sSA countries the dropout rate for 1990 was in the 20-30% range, with only Gambia and Mauritius having single digit dropout rates.
• High costs: In spite of government involvement in primary education, the cost of schooling to parents is signiÞcant. The OXFAM report discusses the various types of direct costs incurred by parents -official fees such as tuition, levies imposed by schools and parent-teacher associations, unofficial fees charged by schools, out-of-pocket payments for uniforms, textbooks, pencils, transport, and meals, and community contributions in cash or kind. • Health & political factors: Can the poor state of education in sSA be mostly explained by the decrease in life expectancy brought about by the AIDS epidemic that has ravaged the area since the 80s? After all, theory predicts that schooling moves in the same direction as life expectancy (an increase in expectancy increasing returns to schooling by increasing the time horizon over which education costs are amortized) and there is empirical evidence consistent with this. 4 Without trivializing the epidemic which clearly deserves it own attention, from the table presented we can see that the average life expectancy in our sub-sample actually increased from 44 years in 1980 to 45.5 years in 1998 in spite of the decrease in life expectancy for six countries. The percentage increase in primary school-age population since 1980 has also been the highest in sSA. It appears that while the epidemic might contribute signiÞcantly to the poor state of education in the region, there are other forces at work, with the stagnation pre-dating the crisis in several countries. 5 While some of the countries in the sub-sample we concentrate have had their share of wars and strife in the last few decades, for instance, Angola, Somalia, and Uganda, most of them, such as Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Tanzania have been relatively free of turmoil. Therefore, it does not seem obvious that war and political chaos alone could account for sSA's stagnant condition, though political stability is clearly desirable for economic well-being.
In summary, sSA is characterized by economic and educational stagnancy and decline, a low quality of education, high costs of education relative to income, a high degree of inequality, a paucity of opportunities for the educated, and low and decreasing government expenditure per pupil on education. In the next section, we will outline a model of education Þnanced mostly by families that features income heterogeneity, dropouts, and the possibility of a trap steady state, which seems eminently suited to analyze the situation of sSA countries.
Mauritius: A Success Story
The island country of Mauritius, classiÞed as a sub-Saharan African country stands in stark contrast to the countries mentioned above. We brießy summarize the education and economic condition of
Mauritius since we will experiment with policies that aim to replicate this country's performance, at least on the educational front. In 1990, Mauritius had a per capita GDP of $5,838, more than ten times the per capita GDP of the worst-performing sSA countries. Its annualized growth rate between 1965 and 1998 was 3.8%. More important for us is the data from Barro and Lee (1996) that indicates the percentage of population who attended secondary school was 36.5% in 1990 and the percentage who completed secondary school was 28.1%. We will therefore analyze policies for the other sSA countries that will result in a steady state close to a 30% level of educational attainment.
While the real government current expenditure per pupil at the primary and secondary levels have been trending downward in the worst-performing sSA countries, they have been moving upward the true outlays are larger than these Þgures would suggest, as the ratios for the poor sSA countries are inßated by their low GDPs. These data suggest the use of education subsidies by the government as a policy instrument to explore in detail.
The opening up of Mauritius to foreign technologies and investment is also often cited as a reason for its development. 6 While our model primarily focuses on policies related to education, we will be able to quantify the improvement in aggregate technology needed in the other sSA countries to stimulate economic development there on a scale comparable to that of Mauritius.
A Model with an Education Trap
As mentioned earlier, our model is based on the one originally developed in Caucutt and Kumar (2001) .The economy is populated by a continuum of two-period lived agents in an overlapping generations setup. The size (measure) of each generation is normalized to one. Agents are children in the Þrst period and parents in the second. Children are born "uneducated" and the central decision of their parents is whether or not to enroll them in school, completion of which ensures that the child will be an "educated" worker next period. If the child is not enrolled, or enrolled but fails (drops out) the child will be an uneducated worker in the following period. Each of these workers becomes a parent next period, has an uneducated child, and the economy continues. Altruism provides the intergenerational linkage. We will use "rich" and "educated" interchangeably, as we will "poor" and "uneducated", throughout the paper.
At an abstract level we need just label workers as educated or uneducated. However, for the calibration we take the stance that all children are "born" with two years of education (our deÞnition of "uneducated") and successful education involves completion of a further eight years of schooling (our deÞnition of "educated" is thus ten years of education). From the data discussed in the previous section, we can see the average years of primary attainment among the worst performing countries is 1.4 years, which motivates our baseline level of education; secondary schooling is often considered to be the minimum level needed for a worker to perform well in the modern economy and is best correlated with economic activity, which motivates our deÞnition of educated workers.
Children differ in their ability to complete the requisite years of schooling needed to be classiÞed as an educated worker. We assume that, conditional on being enrolled, a child with ability a completes education with probability π (a); with probability (1 − π (a)), the child drops out and becomes an uneducated worker. The probability function satisÞes: Education costs could be subsidized to the level s; if so, it is netted out of the cost e. We will present the analytical discussions without the subsidy and introduce the subsidy explicitly when we discuss calibration.
Let the fraction (measure) of educated workers entering the labor force at any time be denoted by n e . This is the only aggregate state variable in this economy. Let e w e (n e ) denote the wage earnings of an educated parent as a function of the aggregate state n e , and let e w u (n e ) denote the wage of an uneducated parent. DeÞne, w j (n e ) ≡ e w j (n e ) + w, (j = e, u) ,
to be the potential earnings of a household of type j. It is then easy to see that the "earnings" of a 7 When we calibrate the model and conduct policy experiments, we use different probability functions for the children of educated and uneducated parents, π e (a) > π u (a), ∀ a ² [0, 1] to capture unmodeled advantages that children of rich parents have in pre-school care and during their school years.
household that does not enroll its child is w j (n e ) and one that does is w j (n e ) − e.
Workers inelastically supply their unitary time endowment. Since we expect the tax rate required to Þnance education to be low, not modeling labor distortion is likely to be a less than egregious omission.
Consider a parent of type j, (j = e, u), who has a child of ability a. If V j (a; n e ) is the value of this parent who optimally decides whether or not to enroll the child, her Bellman equation is:
Here, EV j (a 0 ; n 0 e ) =
, is the child's expected utility, which depends on whether the child enters adulthood as a educated or uneducated worker. We take β to be an intergenerational discount (altruism) factor, and the decision is between enrolling and not enrolling.
The aggregate state that will prevail when the child enters the labor force is denoted by n 0 e . We assume that all parents posit that the aggregate state follows the law of motion:
which they assume to be outside their control. Since there are no aggregate shocks in this economy, this is a deterministic function. Parents thus take the current and future wages as given in solving their optimization problem. We assume a standard utility function, with u 0 > 0, and u 00 < 0.
We now describe aggregate production in this economy. There is a single consumption good produced using educated and uneducated labor as distinct inputs. The CES production function is:
where 0 < γ, ε, ν < 1, and γ 6 ε. The Þrst term within the square brackets can be thought of as "brain" and the second term as "brawn". 8 N e is the number of educated workers employed by the Þrm, while N u is the number of uneducated workers employed. Educated workers are the primary suppliers of "brain". The weight of uneducated workers in this factor, γ, is small and keeps wages bounded even at a trap. Both types of workers contribute toward "brawn". In a competitive labor market, the wage rates e w e and e w u would be the appropriate marginal product and decreasing in N e and N u respectively.
We characterize the behavior of parents in detail in Caucutt and Kumar (2001) and provide only a summary of the results here and move quickly to the new results on a trap steady state, the focus of 8 The terminology is inspired by Stokey (1996). this paper. 9 An examination of (1) suggests that parents' decisions exhibit a threshold (or reservation) ability behavior -a parent of type j enrolls her child if a > a * j (n e ), and does not otherwise. For a parent whose child is at the threshold ability, we can examine the two options of (1) and write:
with equality if a * j (n e ) < 1. For the marginally able child, the discounted beneÞt of enrolling the child is exactly equal to the utility cost of education. Enrolling any child who is more able will result in the parent beneÞting by more than the utility cost. It is not worth the parent's utility cost to send any child who is less able. If the above holds as an inequality even when a * j (n e ) = 1, even the most able child will not be enrolled. The enrollment rate of type j children is then given by
For sake of convenience, deÞne:
Λ (n e ) is the value of education as a function of the aggregate state (and hence common to both parent types), and g j (n e ) , j = e, u, is the utility cost to a parent of type j of enrolling a child. Expression (4) can now be written more compactly as βπ(a * j (n e ))Λ (Φ (n e )) 6 g j (n e ) .
A competitive equilibrium is deÞned in the usual way as a collection of functions e w j (n e ), a * j (n e ), j = l, i, Λ (n e ), and Φ (n e ), on [0, 1], such that the parents' optimality conditions and production optimality conditions are satisÞed, the labor market clears, and Φ (n e ) and Λ (n e ) are consistent with parental decisions. In particular, the law of motion for n e (the transition function) satisÞes:
From the labor market clearing condition of N e = n e , N u = 1 − n e , and the production function (3) we have e w 0 e (n e ) and thus w 0 e (n e ) < 0, and e w 0 u (n e ) and thus w 0 u (n e ) > 0. Together with the concavity of u, this implies g 0 e (n e ) > 0 and g 0 u (n e ) < 0. Given the liquidity constraint, the intuitive result that the richer parents can afford to enroll even children of lower ability while the poorer parents can afford to enroll only higher ability children follows from (7); that is, a * e (n e ) < a * u (n e ), for n e ∈ [0, 1]. This also implies a * e (n e ) < 1. Put differently, the enrollment rates are higher among the rich.
DeÞnition 1 A steady state is a competitive equilibrium with n e = n * e ∈ [0, 1], which satisÞes Φ (n * e ) = n * e .
On a steady state, the wages, reservation abilities, expected utilities, and the fraction (measure)
of educated workers are all constant over time. Manipulating the consistency conditions from (1) we get:
where,
Here, x is extra contemporaneous (ex ante, expected) utility a educated parent gets, taking into account the endogenous effect of a higher wage parent having a higher probability of enrolling a child.
The value of being educated has two components -a contemporaneous utility gain and a discounted future value. If utility is linear, the utility cost for both types of parents is the same. Equation (4) then implies that a * e = a * u , and the second term on the right hand side of (9) vanishes. But for a concave utility function, the second term is positive -there is an additional gain that results from the parent being more likely to enroll her child in school.
We repeat the equations resulting from (4) with the notation introduced above:
βπ(a * e (n e ))Λ (Φ (n e )) = g e (n e )
βπ(a * u (n c ))Λ (Φ (n e )) 6 g u (n e ) , w.e.i a * u (n e ) < 1.
Equations (8) through (12) are four functional equations in the four functions Λ, Φ, a * e , and a * u , and completely describe the dynamics of the model. When n e is replaced by n * e ,we can solve for the four steady state quantities.
Intuitively one would expect the value of education to decrease with the measure of educated people. One would similarly expect the measure of educated workers in the next period to increase with the measure of educated workers this period. In Caucutt and Kumar (2001) we provide conditions that ensure Λ (n e ) is decreasing and Φ (n e ) is increasing.
Qualitatively speaking, there are three types of equilibria that can result. For a given set of production parameters (i.e. wage gap between educated and uneducated workers), when utility cost of uneducated parents is low in the neighborhood of n e = 0, as would occur with a low σ,and/or a low e, a unique steady state with a positive n * e obtains. uneducated parents will always send their children to college, Φ (n e ) is concave and intersects the 45 degree line once. For intermediate utility costs, a * u (n e ) = 1, in the neighborhood of n e = 0. Once the uneducated parent's wage becomes high enough (that is, n e becomes large enough), a * u (n e ) < 1, Φ (n e ) increases at a rapid rate to cross the 45 degree line, and then becomes concave again to re-intersect the 45 degree line. There are three steady states, zero and two positive steady states, with the lower of the two positive steady states being unstable. When the utility cost of uneducated parents is very high, they will either never enroll their children or start enrolling them only for high wages. The increase in the fraction of educated labor is low enough to cause Φ (n e ) < n e in the entire interval in this case. The only possible steady state then is n * e = 0, a development trap. The dynamic behavior of the economy around the origin is governed mainly by the utility cost of uneducated rather than educated parents. Rich parents always enroll a positive fraction of their children and especially so when their wages are very high (n e → 0). But given that they are a very small fraction of the labor force when n e is close to zero, their behavior matters little to the dynamics of the economy. Whether the fraction of educated workers continues to grow in the vicinity of n e = 0, and if so whether it grows at a rate that can sustain a long run equilibrium with a positive fraction of such workers, depend on the behavior of the poor parents. This insight would be obscured by a representative agent model. 10 DeÞnition 2 A trap is a locally stable steady state at n * e = 0.
We turn to a formal analysis next, and provide a sufficient condition for a trap to occur.
Conditions for a Trap
Lemma 1 A necessary condition for a trap is a * u (0) = 1 (the poor do not enroll their children). This condition is sufficient if additionally, a * u = 1 in a neighborhood of n e = 0.
Proof. First we prove necessity. Suppose a trap exists; therefore, Φ (0) = 0. From (8), we can see that at n e = 0, we have
Given the assumptions on π, Φ (0) = 0 only if a * u (0) = 1.
10 It is clear that the Þxed nature of the goods cost of education is responsible for the trap. One could envision an alternate setup in which the time cost of an old agent (the "teacher") is the cost of education. If the teacher is the parent of the child herself, the cost of educating the poor would be very low when the wages of the poor are low, and a trap is unlikely. However, if the cost of educating the child is the time cost of an educated worker, which seems a lot more realistic, a trap would continue to obtain. In fact, the situation would be exacerbated since the wages of the educated are highest when the wages of the uneducated are at their lowest.
Next we show sufficiency. If a * u (0) = 1, (8) implies Φ (0) = 0 so n * e = 0 is indeed a steady state of the dynamic system. Since a * u = 1 also in N r (0), for some n e = ε in this neighborhood, (8) implies,
< ε given the assumptions on π. Φ (n e ) < n e in the neighborhood of n e = 0 implies the steady state is locally stable.
What are the conditions that could yield a * u = 1 in N r (0) and hence a trap? It is useful to Þrst consider linear utility, u (c) = c, since the condition is very intuitive in this case and will help us better understand the condition for the more general isoelastic utility function. Moreover, as mentioned above, a * e = a * u when utility is linear, and the model has the ßavor of a representative agent model. Proof. With u (w) = w, the dynamic system becomes:
Λ (n e ) = x (n e ) = w e (n e ) − w u (n e ) .
The value to being educated does not have a dynamic component here and the economy jumps to the steady state immediately. For this steady state to be zero (i.e. a trap), as argued above a * needs to be one; that is, no one is enrolled. So a condition for a trap, from (13) is β · 1 · (w e (0) − w u (0)) < e, or:
Since the economy jumps to the zero steady state right away from any starting n e stability readily obtains.
Since w c is decreasing in n e and w s is increasing, the wage gap between the educated and the uneducated workers is maximum at zero. The above condition states that if the cost of education is greater than the maximum possible discounted gain, a trap will result. In other words, if the maximum possible discounted return to education is less than one a trap results.
Lemma 3 For a more general utility function, a sufficient condition for a * u = 1 in a neighborhood of n e = 0 and hence a trap is .
Proof. As mentioned earlier, it can be shown that a * e (n e ) < a * u (n e ). From (10) we can therefore show (dropping the argument n e for notational simplicity):
= F (a * e ) (u(w e ) − u(w u )) + (1 − F (a * e )) (u(w e − e) − u(w u − e)) .
Given the concavity of u, it follows that u(w e − e) − u(w u − e) > u(w e ) − u(w u ). Therefore, in the above convex combination we have:
x < u(w e − e) − u(w u − e) < u(w e (0) − e) − u(w u (0) − e), given w 0 e (n e ) < 0 and w 0 u (n e ) > 0. (Together with the concavity of u this also implies that the largest g u can be is u(w u (0)) − u(w u (0) − e).) The dynamic factor in (9) can be bounded by β R 1 0 π(a) dF (a), and therefore the whole expression can be used to write:
The observation made earlier that Λ (n e ) is decreasing and Φ (n e ) is increasing, which implies Λ (n e ) > Λ (Φ (n e )) has been used to derive this. From (9), a sufficient condition for a * u (0) = 1 is:
By evaluating the numerator at a positive value of ε in N r (0) , we can ensure a * u = 1 in a neighborhood of n e = 0.
To better understand this result, note that when we use u (c) = c in the above expression, we retrieve the condition e > β (w e (0) − w u (0)) as in the earlier lemma (noting that the dynamic factor in the linear utility case is 0 instead of β R a * u (ne) a * e (ne) π(a) dF (a), since a * e = a * u ≡ a * ). The numerator of the left hand side in the general condition above is now the utility cost of education to the poor parent instead of the goods cost found in the condition for linear utility. This cost was the same for both types under linear utility, as it would have been in a representative agent model. The contribution then of the heterogeneous agent setup is to identify the cost squarely with the poor agents in the economy. The denominator of the left hand side is now the utility gap of the two types of agents (adjusted for the cost of education) instead of the wage gap; it can be viewed as the utility gain from education.
It can be shown that the entire left hand side is increasing in e and decreasing in w e (0) for a given w u (0); the right hand side is decreasing in β. Therefore, as in the linear utility case, the above trap condition is more likely to be satisÞed when the cost of education is high, the wage gap is low, and the discount factor is low. Additionally, the curvature of the utility function also matters now. Assuming an isoelastic utility function u (c) = c 1−σ 1−σ , σ > 0, (with the σ = 1 case interpreted as log (c)), the left hand side is increasing in σ. Therefore, the likelihood of a trap increases with the curvature of the utility function. Thus the above sufficient condition identiÞes all the intuitive forces that make a trap more likely in our setup.
Calibration
Recall our deÞnition of educated and uneducated workers -an uneducated worker has two years of education and an educated worker has ten years of education. In this section we describe the choice of model parameters that allows us to produce outcomes that are broadly consistent with the sSA countries being close to a trap; that is, with the fraction of workers with education beyond two years close to zero. The quality of data on these countries is not comparable to that of the US. By targeting the average performance of a group of countries discussed in Section 2, we hope to avoid the pitfalls of calibrating to a single country with a particularly low quality of data or one that suffers from an idiosyncratic institutional failure. The aim is to get a set of parameters with which it is sensible to conduct policy analysis.
We assume agents are born at age 6 and are "young" until the age of 25; they become adults at the age of 26, have a child, and die at the age of 45. The model period is thus 20 years. The life-span corresponds closely to the life expectancy of the sSA countries considered (see Table 2 ).
We start by assuming values for certain parameters that are commonly used in the literature. The generational discount factor is set at β = 0.6676, which corresponds to a yearly discount factor of 0.98 compounded over 20 years. We set ν = 0.35, which corresponds to an elasticity of substitution between educated and uneducated labor of 1.54. Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) report that the emerging consensus on the elasticity between skilled and unskilled labor is approximately 1.4 to 1.5. 11
In the absence of direct evidence, we set ε = 0.1, (each unit of skilled labor counts 10% of unskilled labor toward brawn) and leave γ < ε as a free parameter.
As we have seen in the previous section, the likelihood of a trap increases with σ. We use this result and existing arguments for a negative relationship between relative risk aversion and wealth (see, for instance, Ogaki and Zhang (2001)), to set σ at a higher value of 3.5 instead of the usual 2. 12 11 Their deÞnition of skill corresponds to college education. We nevertheless use this elasticity for our deÞnition of skill due to lack of availability of other data. 12 We will later conduct sensitivity analysis, and present the minimal perturbations for crucial parameters, taken one at a time, from its calibrated value for which will the trap to no longer occur.
We assume a uniform ability distribution in [0, 1] ; that is, F (a) = a.
The remaining parameters are particular to the production functions for output and human capital.
They are chosen to broadly match target data on education costs, the wage premium, and enrollment and dropout rates. The erratic nature of data availability, their variability across sources, and the processing required to map available data into corresponding model equivalents warrant a detailed discussion of these targets. Bredie and Beeharry (1998) , who present time use data of school-aged children in Madagascar and conclude that the opportunity cost for boys in school is 20 hours per week, with an adjusted measure for girls a bit higher. 16 We assume this is half the adult 13 Mincerian regressions use log wages, which explains the exponentiation and the number of years of schooling that matters for us is 8.
14 See Table 2 .6. 15 See their Table 5 . 16 See their Annex A. They compare hours spent by schoolgoing and non-schoolgoing children in several categorieswater collection, Þrewood collection, household tasks, and independent agricultural and non-agricultural activities -to work week; non-schoolgoing children work half an adult week and schoolgoing children work none.
We impute the average wage in the economy to this time; in other words, we set w such that it is 0.5y, where y is the average wage earnings.
Consider the income of a family in which the child does not go to school. The present value of the parent's annual income y over 20 years at an 8% rate of discounting is 10.6y. The present value of the child's income is half this at 5.3y. If the family does send the child to school, the present value of the annual parental cost of education (λ 1 − λ 2 ) y over the eight schooling years is calculated as
If the child goes to school, it is assumed that after the Þrst 8 years, the child can work the rest of his youth years with annual earnings of 0.5y; that is, we assume that the increased earnings on account of education do not kick in until adulthood. The present value of these earnings works out to be 2.2y. Therefore, we calculate: We calculate the direct education expenditure net of government subsidies as a fraction of GDP, which is a calibration target, as:
Enrollment and dropout rates: Finally we calculate the enrollment and dropout rates to target.
A "naive" measure of enrollment rate can be obtained by taking a simple average of the primary and secondary enrollment for each country in Table 1 and then taking the average across countries. This works out to 31.8%. However, this does not exactly correspond to the model enrollment rate where the education is really from the beginning of the third year to that of the eighth year. Using the intake rate at the Þrst year and the year-to-year survival rates from the World Education Indicators, it is possible to calculate enrollment rates conditional on students surviving the Þrst two years of education. The average of this enrollment data is 22.9%. The "naive" dropout rate can be obtained as above as an average of the primary dropout rate and secondary repeat rate (which we use as a proxy for the secondary dropout rate on which data is not readily available); it works out to 32.3%
for the countries we are interested in. We can also calculate the dropout rate conditional on students surviving the Þrst two years of their education as 13.5%. Since data for this latter calculation is not available for all countries, with the poorest performing countries most likely to have missing data, this dropout rate is likely to be underestimated.
We parametrize the human capital production function with the properties of π we had assumed earlier: π(0) = 0, π 0 (a) > 0. We now allow for the possibility that these functions can differ across the arrive at the opportunity costs.
two types of families, to account for the advantages educated families might have in the production of human capital. The parametric form we use is:
This convex-concave parametric form was chosen because it allows us to better match the enrollment and dropout rates in the vicinity of the trap. It must be emphasized that such a shape is not required to get a trap in the Þrst place. The curvature of the utility function and costs play a bigger role in causing the trap. We normalize k e = 1.
To summarize, the parameters that remain -production parameters (A, θ, γ), the earnings of a non-schoolgoing child w, expenditure variables (e d , s) , and the probability (human capital production) function parameters (k u ) -are chosen to broadly match the following targets: The resulting total cost of education parameter, e (= e d + (1 − ϕ) w) , is 0.234; in other words, the direct cost is only 13.9% of the total costs.
With these parameters, a trap results. That is, n * e = 0. The Þrst four of the above targets are directly met. A skill premium of 4.96 results, which is within the above-mentioned range seen in data, though close to the upper end. Exactly at the trap, there is no enrollment; a * u = 1, and even though a * e = 0.12 < 1, there is a zero measure of these educated people at the trap. Therefore, we examine the average dropout and enrollment rates in the "vicinity" of the trap (n e = 0.00 − 0.15), with the interpretation that these economies are headed toward a trap if they are not already in it.
The enrollment rate is in the range of 0 to 21%, which is a bit lower than the range given above but in the ballpark of the enrollment rate calculated conditional on students surviving past the second year, while the dropout rate is in the range of 24 to 43%, overlapping considerably with the range seen in data. 17 We assume that the government education expenses are met by taxing all workers and have the government budget balanced according to:
Any student, rich or poor, who goes to school gets subsidies and all workers are taxed; this is the only type of tax-and-subsidy scheme we will consider throughout this paper. 18 At the trap, given that there are no educated workers and zero enrollment of children by uneducated parents, subsidy expenses and hence taxes levied are zero.
In the next section we compare the efficacy of various policies in prying this economy out of the trap.
Policy Experiments
We consider the following policy alternatives to spur development in sSA -a simple tax and subsidy scheme, foreign aid, abolition of child labor, enacting and enforcing a compulsory education law, and infrastructural improvements that lead to an increase in A. We treat the Þrst alternative as our benchmark policy. For the remaining alternatives, we Þrst consider the alternate policy in isolation to study it in detail and later adjust the subsidy level so as to equate equilibrium expenditure to that in the tax and subsidy scheme that maximizes transitional welfare; this allows us to make "revenue neutral" comparisons. 17 The aggregate enrollment and dropout rates are calculated using the following formulae:
A Simple Tax and Subsidy Scheme
The lesson learned from the sufficient conditions, (14) and (15), is that high education costs can cause an economy to move to a trap in the long run. At the prevailing subsidy level, as calibrated above, the net educational cost is high enough to cause a trap. An obvious policy alternative is to Þnd a subsidy level that can cause the economy to not only emerge from the trap, but also results in a desirable long run outcome. As mentioned in Section 2.1, one economy we aim for is one with n * e = 0.3, which is roughly the education attainment in Mauritius. We will assume that the government budget constraint, (16) , holds at every instance and seek the subsidy level s that will cause such a steady state to be attained. The level of subsidy is held constant, and the tax rate τ is varied so as to balance the government budget. Before we search for the subsidy that guarantees such a steady state, we present a graph of the transition function Φ for various subsidy levels in Figure 1 . We can see from this plot that the subsidy has to be high enough for the economy to get on to a transition path that will take it to a non-trap steady state; for instance, s = 0.015 will not get the economy out of the trap. In particular, note that subsidizing the direct cost of 0.0326 alone will get the economy out of the trap, though the resulting n * e is only 0.138. Since everyone pays taxes, but only families who enroll their children get beneÞts, there is a redistribution from the poor families with low ability children to poor families with high ability children in the initial period while the economy is still at the trap. This is the fundamental force that allows this policy to kick start the economy from the trap. Once this process is started, and there are some educated rich parents in the economy, the redistribution is from the low to high ability families of both types, as well as between the rich and the poor. Redistribution is typically viewed in terms of rich and poor families, but in this context it is the redistribution from families with low ability children to those with high ability children that is important. 19 We compare the outcomes in the new and old steady states in Table 3 . Table 3 A simple tax and subsidy scheme As seen in column numbered 2, a subsidy level of 0.09, which is 38.5% of total costs, is needed to take the economy to a steady state of n * e = 0.3. In other words, it is not enough for the government to subsidize only the direct costs of education; it would have to defray part of the child's contribution to the family income that is lost by sending the child to school. At steady state a tax rate of 3.2% needs to be levied on all workers to meet the cost of subsidies. Since all workers are taxed at the same rate, the ratio of government expenditure to GDP will also be 3.2%. This is close to the 3.6%
Þgure cited earlier for Mauritius. 20 This policy will increase output by close to 50%. The ratio of the subsidy (expenditure per pupil) to per capita GDP is 8.75%. The increase in n e will decrease w e and increase w u to cause the premium to drop considerably, to 1.54; most of this is driven by the drop in skilled wages. The economywide enrollment rate is 36.2%, which masks the relatively high enrollment of 61% for educated parents.
The dropout rate is close to 20%.
In the last but one row, we present the equivalent increase in consumption each agent would have to be given in the trap in order to make an equally-weighted aggregate welfare measure the same as that in the new steady state. Each household needs to be given a whopping 20.3% more consumption every period in the trap. When the costs of transition (increased taxes and educational investment when uneducated workers' wages are still low) is taken into account, the gain in welfare is much lower; as seen in the last row, it amounts to an equivalent increase of 6.4% of benchmark consumption, which is still very signiÞcant. The economy is close to the steady state in four to Þve model periods. Next we seek the subsidy level that maximizes the transitional welfare. While an increased subsidy increases enrollment and succeeds in moving a greater fraction of the population toward the higher utility educated category, higher taxes needed to Þnance this subsidy drain income from liquidity constrained parents who are poor during the transition and yet invest more in education in the aggregate. As seen in column 3, at s = 0.157, that is at a subsidy level that is about 67% of total educational cost, the welfare cost of taxes overtakes the beneÞts of subsidies. 21 At this higher subsidy level, the new steady state tax rate is higher at 7%; output inches up and the premium drops further, to 1.28. Enrollment is substantially higher, at 47.2%, which results in a steady state educational attainment of 38%. Both the steady state and transitional consumption equivalents are higher, at 23.6% and 7.9% respectively, with the latter at its maximum possible value. Henceforth, we shall refer to this level of subsidy as our benchmark policy.
The main conclusions we draw from this experiment is that a simple tax and subsidy scheme, can alter the transition function and put the economy on a path toward development at a reasonable cost and increase welfare signiÞcantly even when the transition is taken into account; the subsidies would however have to go beyond direct costs and cover part of the indirect costs as well.
A natural question to ask at this juncture is why we do not see such schemes put in place in practice. Even though ours is not a model of political economy, our simulations point to a few hints 20 The Oxfam report cited earlier states that a "minimum requirement for progressing toward the 2015 target," of achieving universal primary education is education expenditure amounting to 3% of GDP. Our simulations show that at a Þgure close to this, the enrollment rate is not 100%. Simulations presented later show that about 7% of GDP has to be spent on education to ensure 100% enrollment. 21 If taxes were distortionary, this turnaround would occur at a lower level of subsidy.
that might be relevant. There is a drop in wages of the educated, w e , of about 61% going from the trap to the Þrst subsidy level and a drop of 67% to the second subsidy level. Even though the measure of educated workers in the trap is vanishingly small, one can ask the question whether such workers would prefer to be in a trap or in the above steady state in column 3. We Þnd (in Þgures omitted for brevity) that they prefer the trap, and in all experiments the currently uneducated prefer a steady state with subsidies more than the currently educated. 22 There is therefore an incentive for the educated elite, who often occupy key policy making positions in these countries, to not subsidize education and preserve the monopoly they enjoy for their children who are more likely to be educated.
If this incentive effectively causes subsidization to be blocked, the economy will remain in a trap.
The Question of Foreign Aid
The Oxfam report mentioned in Section 2 recommends an increase in foreign aid to sSA countries as well as an increase in the portion of this aid devoted to basic education. Indeed several of the sSA countries already receive considerable amounts of foreign aid. Given their low GDPs, aid as a percentage of GDP for some of these countries is high; it is 5.65% for Malawi, 7.65% for Mali, 5.38%
for Niger, 4.44% for Somalia, and 5.86% for Tanzania. 23 However, not all of this aid is likely to be devoted to basic education. Moreover, international outlays for foreign aid have been dwindling.
Burnside and Dollar (2000) state, "...in 1997 OECD countries gave less, as a share of GNP, than they have in decades." They also Þnd that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good policies, but little effect on those with poor policies.
The previous experiment suggests that even an economy locked into a trap need not be dependent on foreign aid to kick start its development. It is welfare improving to tax workers and raise the funds for subsidizing education locally. Indeed one of the complaints donors of foreign aid have is that the funds are frittered away and rarely reach intended targets. When the funds are generated within the poor country via taxation there is a greater scope for political accountability of funds.
Despite these considerations, we conduct an experiment that mimics foreign aid. The workers in the poor country are not taxed; instead foreign aid is expected to cover the subsidies that are needed to take the economy to the same steady state as the benchmark policy of n * e = 0.38. The elimination of taxes causes little change to the economic aggregates such as output, the skill premium, and enrollment rates. 24 The subsidy level is a bit lower than before at 0.152; workers earn slightly higher income without taxes and thus need a lower subsidy to induce them to enroll their children. Needless 22 This need not be the case when transition is factored in, since the educated workers can beneÞt from the higher than steady state wages. 23 This data is from Burnside and Dollar (2000) and is averaged over available data for the period 1970-1993. 24 There might be a more perceptible increase if labor distortion of taxes is modeled.
to say, welfare is higher when the subsidies are met from foreign aid instead of domestic taxes. Each agent would have to be given 30% more consumption every period in the trap to equate aggregate welfare to the one that obtains in the foreign aid regime. When transition is factored in, this Þgure reduces to about 14%; this is about 42% higher than the equivalent Þgure in the tax and subsidy scheme.
As a fraction of GDP, subsidy expenditures are a bit higher than 6.8%. It appears inconceivable that countries will be willing to donate this amount in foreign aid in perpetuity for providing basic education; as a fraction of the pre-subsidy GDP, a Þgure that can be compared to the aid-to-GDP ratios given above, the aid has to be as high as 10.4% for education alone. Given that a welfare improving domestic taxation scheme is possible it seems more prudent for an sSA economy to institute such a policy than wait for uncertain foreign aid.
If the government can borrow on a long-term basis from other countries or development agencies to Þnance increased education expenditures during the transition, thereby not forced to balance its budget in the short run, the resulting increase in welfare will be in between the Þgures given in Table   3 and the ones reported in this subsection where donor countries give outright aid instead of loans.
Abolition of Child Labor
Since indirect costs are a signiÞcant proportion of the total cost of primary education, it appears reasonable to consider a policy that abolishes child labor; this would reduce the cost perceived by parents. That is, in addition to ethical reasons, there may be economic reasons for such an abolition.
There is, however, a loss of family income, and it will be interesting to examine the overall effect on welfare.
We consider different variants of this experiment. We initially assume that abolition of child labor amounts to zero contribution from the child to the family income. This might seem extreme since the child could do work within the house or in the family farm if not outside, as well in those years she is not in school. So, we also consider a case where the child contributes ϕw irrespective of whether the child goes to school or not (in earlier experiments the child who does not go to school earns the full w). In other words, the indirect cost is zero under both assumptions, but the family income is higher in the second case. Under either assumption, we consider the abolition of child labor in isolation with the subsidy level kept at the trap level, as well as with subsidies to the schoolgoing children that would involve the same outlays by the government as in the benchmark tax-and-subsidy scheme in column 3, Table 3 ; i.e. we make a revenue neutral comparison. Table 4 summarizes the outcomes of these experiments, where column 1 repeats the trap outcome for sake of convenience. If the child's contribution to the family is zero after the abolition of child labor goes into effect (column 2), the fraction of educated workers and the output increases more than they do with the tax and subsidy scheme presented in Table 3 ; n * e is now 43.4% instead of 30% and Y * is 1.071 instead of 1.028. The cost of education goes down from 0.234 to e d = 0.0326, a 86% decrease. Therefore even though family income goes down right after the abolition, enrollment increases, causing n * e to increase -the utility cost of rich parents, g e , drops by 37%, and that of poor parents, g u , drops by 46% The increase in attainment causes the premium to decrease even more than it did earlier.
If the economy could jump to the new steady state right away, the increases in average wage and the fraction of workers in the educated category with higher utility compensate for the loss of children's income and increase welfare. The equivalent compensation is 1.2% of benchmark consumption, lower than those in the tax and subsidy scheme. However, once the transition, with increased educational investment (in the aggregate) coupled with a loss in family income, is taken into account there is a huge negative effect on welfare; each worker willing to pay close to 8% of their benchmark consumption to stay at the trap.
In column 3, we study how the outcome changes relative to column 2, when in addition to the abolition of child labor, the government gives subsidies to equate government expenditure to the one in the benchmark tax-and-subsidy scheme. The entire direct cost is subsidized; there are enough tax revenues left over to partly compensate each family for lost children's contributions. With no indirect costs, a complete subsidy of direct costs implies utility cost g i = 0, which in turn implies a * i = 0 and thus a 100% enrollment for both types. But given the tax rate of 6.9% compared to the 0.6% in column 2, the welfare is even lower. 25 The equivalent compensation for a jump to the new 25 It is interesting that nearly the same tax rate is not able to produce a 100% in the tax and subsidy scheme presented in Table 1 . For enrollment decisions it is the perceived cost of education that matter, and by eliminating indirect costs, child labor abolition is able to achieve higher enrollment rates.
steady state is only 0.67% of consumption, with each household willing to pay close to 20% of their consumption at the trap to avoid this policy.
Columns 4 and 5 consider the less severe assumption of a child's contribution to family income of ϕw. The aggregate outcomes of column 4 are same as those of 2, and column 5 same as those of 3, except for welfare. Given the assumption that all children contribute ϕw to their families, the perceived indirect cost is still zero; the enrollment behavior and attainment are therefore unchanged.
However, the steady state welfare is much higher and the loss when the transition is factored in is lower. Welfare, factoring transition, is never higher relative to the trap.
Note the high dropout rates when enrollment is driven to 100%. Unless the quality of education as capture by the π i functions improves, an increase in enrollment, which draws students from the lower end of the ability distribution will inevitably raise the likelihood of failure.
In summary, the abolition of child labor with or without added education subsidies yields higher enrollment rates and educational attainment than the tax-and-subsidy scheme, but yields lower welfare than the trap once transition is factored in. Even when welfare comparisons are made across steady states, this scheme fares worse than the tax and subsidy scheme.
Compulsory Education
Instead of leaving the enrollment decision to the parent, what if the sSA economies institute and enforce a law that mandates all children should compulsorily attend school and subsidize their direct cost, thereby claiming a 100% enrollment? 26 Note that in this case, n e evolves mechanically according to:
The optimality conditions that characterize enrollments are now irrelevant. Table 5 presents the outcome in this case.
Column 1 shows the outcome with compulsory education alone, while column 2 does the revenue neutral experiment. The steady state welfare gain in column 1 is substantial, but is still lower than that in Table 3 . Once transition is factored in, there is a welfare loss. Since all children, even those whose parents would not have found it proÞtable to send to school in the absence of the compulsory education law, are forced to go to school and suffer a loss in income of (1 − ϕ) w, aggregate welfare decreases. 26 In the absence of evidence on enforcement costs, we assume free enforcement of laws. Since compulsory education leaves the children's contribution at ϕw for all families and direct costs are fully subsidized, the revenue neutral outcome in column 2 is identical to the revenue neutral case where the abolition of child labor is assumed to give all families an income of ϕw from children (Table 4 , column 5). In both cases the subsidy is high enough to guarantee 100% enrollment in the steady state. Transitional welfare is different, since the enrollment rate need not be 100% in transition in the earlier case, but is so here. The transitional welfare is still lower than that in the trap.
In conjunction with results from the previous experiment, the above outcome seems to imply that the sSA economies have to be cautious in aiming purely for the maximization of enrollment or attainment. The loss of children's contribution to family income can decrease aggregate welfare.
Moreover, unless the quality of education is improved increases in enrollment draw students from the lower end of the ability pool thereby increasing the rate of failure.
Improvements in Infrastructure
Can the sSA economies emerge from the trap due to an increase in the total factor productivity, A?
As mentioned earlier, Mauritius is credited for opening up its economy to foreign technology to spur development. From the point of view of the trap condition (14) , it can be shown that (w e − w u ) is increasing in A, whenever w e > w u , making it less likely that a trap will result. That is, instead of a change in educational costs through subsidies, can the incentive to get educated work through an increase in the return to education arising from an improvement in the production function? We look at potential improvements in infrastructure that can increase in A as there is more direct evidence on this. If one views A as I ζ , where I is the infrastructural stock and ζ is an elasticity parameter, one can ask by what factor I will have to increase in order to take the economy to the same steady state that results in the tax-and-subsidy case.
The World Development Report 1994 surveys the estimates for ζ found in literature as well as addresses the issue of causality. 27 We use ζ = 0.4, which is at the upper end of the range of reported estimates, and close to the one reported by Aschauer (1989) . We Þnd that to get close to n * e = 0.38, the value of A has to increase from 2 to 5. Using the above value for ζ then implies that the infrastructure stock has to increase by a factor close to 10. 28 In the absence of clear evidence connecting infrastructure expenditure and the stock we do not attempt to estimate the tax rate that will be needed to Þnance this increase and the concomitant effect on welfare. It suffices to note that a massive increase in infrastructure is required to achieve the same effect that can be obtained by altering the composition of the workforce (with the same production function) through a relatively painless tax and subsidy scheme.
Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we present the minimal perturbations for each parameter, taken one at a time, from its calibrated value for which will the trap to no longer occur.
Conclusion
We present details on the education and economic conditions of the low performing sub-Saharan African countries. We then present a simple heterogeneous-agent model in which high costs of education relative to income and the skill premium cause the economy to be trapped in a low steady state with minimal educational attainment and thus are able to characterize the above countries. Policy experiments on a calibrated model suggest that a simple tax and subsidy scheme that redistributes resources at the trap from poor households with lower ability children to those with higher ability children can pry the economy out of the trap, freeing the economy from dependence on foreign aid in order to achieve similar outcomes. This policy is superior in welfare terms, whether one compares steady states or accounts for transitions, to the abolition of child labor and the institution and enforcement of compulsory education laws. Under revenue neutrality, these latter policies are unable to reverse the loss of contributions low ability children would have made to their families if they were not forced to school. These simulations question the stated goal of several agencies to achieve universal enrollment. At the current stage of development of these economies and the quality of educational systems that are likely to prevail in the near future, polices that guarantee this level of enrollment 27 See Box 1.1. 28 The World Development Report 1994 states that the slope of the infrastructure stock vs per capita GDP is roughly 1. Given that the Mauritian per capita income is about 10 times the median of our sSA sample, its infrastructure capital is 10 times higher, in line with the required increase in I we estimate.
need not be welfare improving. Thus it matters as to how increases in enrollment and attainment are achieved.
Political economy considerations, which has received only a cursory treatment in this paper, also deserve more serious attention. Further work is warranted on assembling better data in order to reÞne the calibration process. This is especially needed in order to study improvements in the quality of education, which is subsumed in our probability functions. An improvement in the quality of education will alter welfare comparisons by boosting the schemes that currently result in 100% enrollment. One could model the education sector explicitly and study the quality of teachers as well as indices such as teacher-student ratios to address quality improvements. These are the topics of ongoing research.
